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1. Introduction
In this work we propose some elements of an interpretation of the dynamics of system
integration (and disintegration) in the case of complex product systems (CoPS henceforth).
The latter include a significant subset of capital goods such as most mobile communication
systems, many military systems, corporate information technology networks, train engines,
aircrafts, "intelligent buildings", air traffic control systems, tailored software packages, and
many others.
CoPS differ from mass-produced goods in terms of product and production characteristics
as well as patterns of innovation, competitive strategies, market characteristics and
managerial constraints (for a thorough discussion, see Hobday (1998)). For example, design
and implementation are usually carried out through major projects often involving also
temporary multi-firm alliances. Moreover the multi-component and multi-technology nature
of CoPS requires that manufactures be active in multiple technological fields in order to
design, develop, integrate and manufacture products.
Research on CoPS has often emphasized the role of some key manufactures as coordinators
of their own internal activities as well as the activities of a network of actors (such as
component suppliers, but sometimes also universities, regulatory bodies, etc.) involved in2
the industry. Indeed, across many CoPS industries, a particular class of leading producers
are responsible for the overall coordination of production and innovation: in the definition
originally proposed by Rothwell (1992) they act as  system integrator. In turn, such
distinctive patterns of industrial organization hint at major interpretative questions with
bearings well beyond the domain of CoPS themselves, and touching the very core of the
analysis of economic organizations, their boundaries, their relationships with each other,
their evolution.
In section 2, we briefly spell out a few of such questions which stand in the background and
motivate our study. Section 3 presents an overview of evidence on the organization of
design and production of CoPS, together with some elements of an interpretation. Finally, in
section 4 we attempt to link the latter with an evolutionary theory of knowledge
accumulation and organizations.
2. The changing Boundaries between Organizations and Markets: Some Background
Issues
It would be futile to try to tackle here at any depth the determinants of those fuzzy and
proximate boundaries separating what is done inside relatively coherent organizational
entities whose inner working is only limitedly subject to market-type exchanges vs.  what
occurs through the intermediation of exchanges amongst independent actors. Here, suffice
to recall some different, albeit not  mutually exclusive, lines of interpretation.
A first  one, dating back to (parts of) Adam Smith's Inquiry  going all the way to Stigler
(1951) and (1968) and to e.g. the refinements on 'complementarities' by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) focuses on the performances of particular tasks and on the advantages of
specialization under certain indivisibilities and scale conditions. The famous pin making
example of A. Smith is the archetype. Indeed, there is little doubt that "virtuous circles"
between expanding scales of production, division of labour and increasing efficiency have
been a powerful driver of secular productivity growth.3
However, a distinct issue concerns the relationships between specialization across tasks vs.
specialization across firms. Historically, the former is a robust stylized fact; much less so
the latter. Firms are typically multi-task, and often multi-product, entities which internally
govern the processes of division of labour and the coordination amongst separated tasks.
What accounts then for such systematic discrepancies?
An answer is suggested, as well known, by a second line of interpretation of the boundaries
of the firm, based on the nature of transactions and the related transaction costs - inspired by
Coase (1937) and developed by Williamson (1975) and (1985). Here the unit of analysis are
not "technical" tasks but elementary transactions: hierarchical organizations are compared to
market forms of coordination in terms of relative efficiencies in transaction governance. The
scope for opportunistic behaviours, depending in turn on asset specificities and other
characteristics of transactions, twists the balance one way or another and  - the theory
suggests - shapes the approximate boundaries between organization-based vs. market based
mechanisms of coordination.
Third, a different (but, to repeat, not necessarily alternative) interpretation focuses upon the
division of knowledge -  as distinct from the division of "operational" tasks  - across
organizations and upon organization-specific learning processes. It is a perspective which
finds its roots in seminal works of Herbert Simon and collaborators (cf. Simon (1981) and
(1991), March and Simon (1993))
1. In a nutshell, such a perspective conjectures that
proximate boundaries of corporate organizations are heavily shaped by the nature of the
competences/capabilities organizations embody
2 and by their learning patterns.
Organizational knowledge, in turn, applies to diverse domain such as a) allocative
capabilities (e.g. deciding what to produce, how to price it, etc.); b) transactional capabilities
(deciding whether to make or buy, etc.); c) administrative capabilities (concerning e.g. the
designing of effective governance structures); d) problem-solving capabilities (concerning,
                                             
1 Nelson and Winter (1982), Freeman (1982), Chandler ((1977) and (1990)), Richardson (1990), further developed in Winter
(1987), Dosi and Marengo (1994), Patel and Pavitt (1997), Pavitt (1998), Teece (1996), Teece et al. (1994a) and (1994b),
Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000), amongst many others; and largely overlapping with "core competences" theories of the
firm (Prahlad and Hamel (1990))
2 For more detailed recent discussions of these notions cf. Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000).4
at large, the organization of design, planning, production, etc.); e) search capabilities
(covering, in a shorthand, technological search for new products and processes of
production, new organizational arrangements, new strategic positioning, etc.) (cf. Teece et
al. (1994a)).
Note also the likely overlapping amongst the three foregoing perspectives.
For example, if organizational capabilities have mainly to do with the dynamic of
transaction characteristics, the explanatory variables of the (changing) organizational
boundaries mainly concern the features of the mechanisms for transaction governance (cf.
the discussions in Langlois (1992) and Foss (1993)). Conversely, if one were able to neatly
decompose "chunks" of knowledge and neatly map them into organizational activities, one
would also get a large overlapping between "knowledge-centred" views of firm boundaries.
Indeed, many analyses focussed on  technological modularity  hint at this interpretative
perspective. In the management literature, modularity was first proposed as a product design
strategy aimed at defining stable interfaces amongst components (modules) composing a
product. Together, its is suggested, each module may be improved (e.g. via changes in
design, the introduction of new materials, etc.) within a predefined range of variation, with
little or no impact on the design of the other modules (Ulrich (1995)). The further step is the
claim that modularity carries over from product design to the very characteristics of
organizations. As, for example, Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) argue, if components'
interfaces can be fully specified and standardized, they also determine  relatively stable
product and production architectures. Hence, also the processes for improving single
modules may be de-coupled and carried out by independent organizational entities. Firms,
therefore, may well choose to either specialize in the design (and/or assembly) of final
products or in specific modules, largely leaving the interfaces to market exchanges.
Somewhat similar considerations apply to the role of market transaction concerning the very
"chunks of knowledge" and, in primis, technological knowledge. Clearly, codification and
(lack of) context-dependency influence the importance of market exchanges. In this respect,
Arora et al (2001), Cowan et al (2000) suggest that, in fact, an increasing codification of
technological knowledge fosters a growing importance of "market for technologies". The5
robustness and extent of this tendency is subject of lively debate (cf. Pavitt (  )   for another
view).
In any case, we have here some major interpretative questions, including:
1.  the relationships between division of labour (e.g. amongst operational tasks) and
division of knowledge within and across corporate organizations;
2.  the ensuing determinants of the proximate boundaries between activities internalized
within single organizations and those mediated by market relations;
3.  the very nature inter-organizational relations, hardly reduceable to impersonal
exchanges.
With respect to all this issues, CoPS are a puzzling case to the point.
3. The messy dynamics of ‘making’ and ‘knowing’: some empirical evidence on the
relevance of systems integration
There is growing empirical evidence that division of labour and division of knowledge,
though connected, follow different and often apparently uncorrelated dynamics both within
business organizations (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001) and in the economy at large. In
particular, the less-than-perfect overlap between knowledge and product boundaries of
business firms has been corroborated by in-depth industry case studies based on both
qualitative and quantitative evidence, as recalled below.
Based on systematic observations on US patent statistics in several industrial sectors,
Granstrand et al. (1997) argue that decisions related to products are distinct from those
concerning their underlying capabilities (e.g. technological).  Thus, for example,
outsourcing the production of components does not necessarily entail outsourcing the sets of
knowledge employed to specify, design, integrate, manufacture, test and assemble them.
They argued that “firms should maintain capabilities in exploratory and applied research in6
order to have the capability to monitor and integrate external knowledge and production
inputs” (p.20).
Miller et al. (1995) in their study on the flight simulation industry underline the role of
leading firms that act as integrators of other firms’ knowledge and activities.  The
knowledge bases of these systems integrators span many different knowledge domains and
include:
•  the scientific and technological fields underpinning the high variety of components
and subsystems,
•  organisational (e.g. project-management) and relational (e.g. marketing) capabilities
required to manage and integrate the activities of multiple actors involved in the
industry;
•  knowledge about client requirements, and
•  knowledge about rules and regulations for engine certification.
This in-depth study showed that the revolutionary changes (being technological or
institutional in nature) that occurred in the industry heavily affected component suppliers
but not so much flight simulator suppliers (i.e. the systems integrators).
Prencipe (2002) argues that in the aircraft engine industry although engine manufacturers
make extensive use of collaborative agreements, they maintain a broad and deep range of
in-house capabilities in order to understand and co-ordinate the technological workings of
the network of suppliers involved in the industry.  In particular, the aircraft engine industry
is characterised by a set of driving forces whose combined effect ‘enables’ and ‘pushes’
engine makers to resort to suppliers to a greater extent than hitherto.  The former forces
include accumulated knowledge of the behaviour of the engine system, the knowledge
codification process, increasing use of powerful computers, while major “pushing” factors
include spiralling development costs, pressures from developing countries, and advantages
of specialisation.7
The modularization of the engine is just one (albeit an important one) of these driving
forces.  The impact of these forces has resulted in a greater division of labour between
engine manufacturers and suppliers.  In particular, due to accumulated knowledge of the
behaviours about components as well as of the entire system, manufacturers are able to
conceive engines in terms of modules and delegate the design and manufacture of larger
engine parts to suppliers.  As an industry expert summarised it “If I want to make a list of
these 10,000 [engine] parts and I want to put a price against each of them, then the name of
the supplier, you will find that between 60-80% of the total value is outside the systems
integrator.”
However, despite increasing outsourcing of components, as the study by Prencipe showes,
engine makers maintain a broad range of in-house technological capabilities and the breadth
of these capabilities is shown to increase over time. While there is a trend in the industry
towards a greater division of labour between engine manufacturers and suppliers, there is no
evidence of increasing “technological focusing” and knowledge specialization of engine
makers themselves.
The persistence of in-house multitechnology bases despite the increasing use of outsourcing
policies points to the untidy trend followed by division of labour and division of knowledge.
Indeed, if product decomposability does not necessarily entail knowledge decomposability,
then the knowledge boundaries and the product boundaries of the firm are likely to differ.
Decisions to outsource components do not necessarily entail outsourcing technological
knowledge.  Component outsourcing and technology outsourcing though connected are
distinct phenomena.  Prencipe (2002) argues that the scope for technology outsourcing for
engine manufacturers is limited by two interrelated factors, namely (a) the technological and
product requirements for the engine integration and (b) the need to co-ordinate the network
of the actors involved in the industry.
Both factors foster the possession of profound knowledge in different technological fields.
Engine manufacturers do divide up engine development tasks across a number of external
suppliers, but this  task-partitioning capability (Von Hippel, 1990) hinges on their8
multitechnology bases.  Moreover, the capabilities of engine manufacturers must span over
a wide spectrum of technologies in order to co-ordinate from a technological viewpoint the
work of suppliers, airframers, airlines, and regulatory bodies, etc..  Co-ordination in this
industry therefore, is not achieved through arms’ length relationships but needs to be
actively pursued by all-round knowledgeable engine manufacturers.  Engine manufacturers
act in other words as the systems integrators of the industry.  Their multitechnology bases
constitute their systems integration capabilities.
Brusoni (2001) finds similar evidence in his study on the chemical engineering industry.  By
comparing the evolution of the pattern of division of labour between operators and
contractors, notwithstanding increasing product modularity, he highlights the persistent
need for explicit efforts of co-ordination by so-called operators, which play the role of the
systems integrators of the industry.  In his words “despite the increasing involvement of
contractors in high-level design decisions, all the operators involved in this study have
retained in-house capabilities related to critical components.  In particular, they maintain
both conceptual and detailed design capabilities related to the reactor, which is the key
component of the plant.  Changes in this specific piece of equipment are likely to bring
about systemic changes.  Operators also maintain research units focused on the theory and
modelling of reactor behaviour” (Brusoni, 2001).
Based on a longitudinal study of the Italian packaging machine industry, Lorenzoni and
Lipparini (1999) identify within inter-firm networks the role lead firms that act as systems
integrators of external specialised sources of components and knowledge for innovations.
The packaging industry has been characterised by a continuous trend of outsourcing of tasks
of different nature (design, manufacturing, and assembly) to first- and second-tier suppliers.
As Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999: 328) underlined, the boundaries of the leading firms of
such network organisations have shrunk over time due to the “progressive disintegration of
the manufacturing process”.
The three case studies analysed by Lorenzoni and Lipparini, in fact, showed that all the lead
firms under scrutiny increased their reliance on external suppliers. However,9
notwithstanding this increasing reliance on external resources, Lorenzoni and Lipparini
found that “rather than using external ties as a substitute for capabilities which a firm has
not yet developed, firms use collaborations to expand and improve their core competencies”
(1999: 334). Again, these complementarities of organisational capabilities within a few
firms rather than strict division of knowledge amongst firms themselves is consistent with
the relevance of systems integration as a crucial co-ordination mechanism in network-like
forms of industrial organization and the related importance of system integrating firms.
More specifically, with regards to CoPS industries, it is worth noting that the evidence has
clearly shown that their products are characterised by two persistent trends, namely (a)
incorporation of an increasing number of functionalities that increase the integration of the
number of parts and components (multi-component) as well as services and (b)
incorporation of an increasing number of new and sometimes distant scientific and
technological disciplines (multi-technology).  These two trends heavily impact on the
definition of the boundaries of the firm (particularly make-or-buy decisions) since CoPS
suppliers must increasingly resort to external sources of components, equipments, and
technologies.  Firms are required to set up and manage a network of institutions that are
involved in the industry.  As a consequence, systems integration capabilities are due to
become even more important in the future.
The incorporation of services (e.g. maintenance, finance) and the move towards the supply
of ‘bundled’ systems rather than individual subsystems (Tidd et al, 1997) is a trend that
deserves separate treatment.  Research on CoPS (Davies, 2002; Prencipe, 2002) has stressed
that suppliers are moving downstream to provide bundled systems (integrated solutions or
turnkey projects) to buyers.  Bundled systems are comprised of hardware and software
components often linked by proprietary interfaces that tie customers into a product and
service solution with a single point of purchase and after-sales support.  Suppliers of such
solutions generate an increasing proportion of revenues through service-enhanced activities
(e.g. maintenance and technical support) rather than manufacturing (Chandran et al, 1997).10
In some industries, the move towards downstream business activities and the ensuing
development of service capabilities by systems integrators has become a sort of “strategic
imperative”. So for example the re-birth of IBM is ascribed to its reinvention as “solutions
provider”.  In the aircraft engine industry, shrinking margins, high development costs, and
long payback periods to recoup the initial financial investment have prompted engine
makers to explore new ways of pricing engines that would better stabilise their revenue
stream.  Leasing agreements, where manufacturers lease their engines rather than selling
them, represents an option.  Rolls-Royce in the 1970s had already introduced power-by-the-
hour agreements for operators of corporate jets, according to which customer airlines pay a
fixed rate that includes both capital and operating costs.  This agreement provides an
incentive to the manufacturer to improve engine reliability and reduce maintenance costs
because it manages the entire engine life cycle: engine manufacturers provide an integrated
system solution.  Airlines might benefit too, since with improved engine reliability they
have less down time.
In turn, in order to offer  power-by-the-hour agreements engine manufacturers need a
sufficiently large number of ground maintenance facilities spread around the world.  This
can be achieved either by acquisitions or via agreements with existing independent
maintenance companies.  Together, reliable engines and fast maintenance operations
provide engine manufacturers with a competitive lead.  Information related to engine
behaviour becomes extremely valuable and a real time engine monitoring system is the tool
to garner it.  Digital engine control systems equipped with engine health diagnostics become
necessary for engine manufacturers wanting to offer power-by-the-hour agreements
(Prencipe, 2002). All in all, the process does not entail higher degrees of vertical integration
when observed from the point of view of the actual production of goods and services, but
does involve an extension of the knowledge bases which system integrators are required to
master.
All the foregoing examples suggest patterns of: a) vertical disintegration in production, b)
(complementary) “Smithian” specialization in particular components, and c) persistent
concentration of broad knowledge bases within few “system integrators”.11
Partial counterexamples to these patterns are equally revealing: consider for instance the
case of telecommunications, where a tendency toward vertical disintegration in production
still applies. However the importance of broad based knowledge carried by system
integrators might actually be diminishing, this does not imply a diminishing importance of
system integration activities, rather the latter appears to be pushed “upward” and embodied
into the producers of crucial components. To a significant extent, system integration is
increasingly incorporated into the underlying microelectronic components.
4. Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Interpretations
The foregoing evidence abundantly support the notion that explicit activities of system
integration, in the presence of widespread component specialization, are a fundamental
coordination mechanism which hardly falls within the scope of the rudimentary
representations  of market exchanges familiar to a good deal of economic theory. Such
integration activities are performed by specific types of organizations - distinct in terms of
technological and coordination capabilities. At the same time, the degrees of vertical
integration of these firms vary also as a function of the nature and dynamics of multiple
competences and subsystems technological trajectories.
How does one interpret this evidence? Teece et al (1994b) conjectured that the proximate
boundaries of firms are shaped by the interplay between technological opportunities;
convergence/divergence of technological trajectories; degrees of cumulativeness of
idiosyncratic technological learning; and asset specificities.
The patterns displayed by CoPS broadly corroborate the general notion emphasized by
Teece et al., but common to the evolutionary literature, according to which the nature and
dynamics of technological knowledge is a fundamental determinant of the vertical and
horizontal boundaries of firms. However, the evidence from CoPS also vividly illustrates a
further distinction between different types of knowledge which organizations embody.12
A first type relates, roughly speaking, to the “ability of doing things” and the way doing A
affects or not the ability of doing B and/or the advantages and costs of governing market
relations when selling and buying A or B. Clearly, this is also a domain where evolutionary,
knowledge centred analyses significantly overlap with both transaction cost interpretations
of make vs. buy behaviours and also “Smithian” interpretations based on specialization-
driven increasing returns.
A second, somewhat distinct, type of knowledge regards “how products are put together”,
that is how multiple components, possibly manufactured by independent producers, are
ultimately assembled into complex products (cars, airplanes, steel plants, flight simulators,
submarines, etc.) which generally perform the task they are meant to, notwithstanding the
lack of either central planners or magic pre-existing modularity between components.
Finally, organizational knowledge concerns how to “search for what is not already there”,
and possibly how to coordinate search efforts amongst independent agents. CoPS, we
suggest, highlight dynamic patterns whereby knowledge accumulation in these three
foregoing domains are only loosely coupled. An important observable consequence entails
diverging dynamics in the scope of what firms do vs. what (some) firms know.
In this vein, Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt (2001) argue that distinct  system-integrating
organizations  are a fundamental node in loosely coupled systems which emerge when
complex products are characterised by either uneven (and relatively high) rates of change in
the underlying technologies (even when component complementarities remain rather
predictable), or, conversely, when interdependency patterns tend to change in unpredictable
ways.
In these circumstances "system integration" entails technological and organizational
capabilities to integrate multiple changes in components and subsystems only partly
designed or even forecasted by "integrators" themselves. Together, "system integrators" are
crucial in the persistent, imperfect, efforts to match the untidy dynamics of division of
"operational" labour, knowledge accumulation and cross-corporate division of competences.13
Granting all this, what kind of "reduced form", relatively abstract, formal representations
can one offer of such organizational structure, if any? A basic building block regards the
explicit account of organizations as repositories of problem solving procedures. In Marengo
et al (2000) one develops a formalism aimed to capture diverse and (most often suboptimal)
routines of production and search embodied in different firms.
Let us start by presenting the basic qualitative features of such modelling exercises (More in
Hobday,  Dosi, and Marengo (2002)).
In the view proposed here, the basic units of analysis for problem-solving behaviour (PSB
henceforth) are, on the one hand, elementary physical acts (such as moving a drawing from
one office to another) and elementary cognitive acts (such as a simple calculation) on the
other.  Problem-solving can then be defined as a combination of elementary acts within a
procedure, leading eventually to a feasible outcome (e.g. an aircraft engine or a chemical
compound).  Or, seen the other way round, given the possibly infinite set of procedures
leading to a given outcome or product, it is possible to decompose these procedures into
diverse series of elementary cognitive and physical acts of varying lengths which may be
executed according to various possible execution architectures (e.g. sequential, parallel or
hierarchical).
PSB straightforwardly links with the notion of organisational competencies and capabilities.
First, a firm displays the operational competencies associated with its actual problem-
solving procedures (in line with the routines discussed by Nelson and Winter, 1982 and
Cohen et al., 1996).  Second, the formal and informal organisational structure of the firm
determines the way in which cognitive and physical acts are distributed and the
decomposition rules which govern what is and what is not admissible within a particular
firm (providing a route into the analysis of incentive structures and processes). Third, the
organisation shapes the search heuristics for, as yet, unresolved problems, thereby
governing creative processes within the firm.
This theoretical approach to PSB within the firm also closely corresponds to empirical
accounts of firm behaviour from the economics of innovation (Freeman, 1982; Dosi, 1988;14
Pavitt, 1999). Moreover, it has the benefit of being applicable both to the analysis of intra-
firm structures and to the analysis of the boundaries between firms and the market.  Indeed,
such boundaries can be seen as particular patterns of decomposition of an overall problem-
solving task.  In other words, the boundary of the firm is shaped, in part, by the problem to
be solved, often corresponding to the product to be created (e.g. a car or a piece of steel).
Particular decomposition strategies may notionally range from the totally centralised and
autarkic types (with no decomposition at all) to the equivalent of an ideal pure market,
where one person acts on each task with market-like transactions linking each elementary
act.
It is helpful to think of complex problem-solving activities as problems of design: the design
of elaborate artefacts and the design of the processes and organisational structures required
to produce them.  In turn, these processes require the design of complex sequences of
moves, rules, behaviours and search heuristics involving one or many different actors to
solve problems, create new "representations" of problems themselves and ultimately to
achieve the techno-economic goals at hand.  Common to all these design activities is that
they involve search in large combinatorial spaces of ‘components’ (as defined above in
terms of elementary physical and cognitive acts) which have to be closely co-ordinated.  To
complicate matters still further, the functional relations among these elements are only
partly understood and can only be locally explored through a process of trial-and-error
learning, often involving also the application of expert, partly tacit knowledge.
For example, the design of a complex artefact such as an aircraft or a flight simulator
requires the co-ordination of many different design elements, including engine type and
power, wing size and shape and other materials.  The interaction between each of the sub-
systems and components is only partly understood and each comprises many smaller
components and sub-systems (Miller et. al, 1995; Prencipe, 1997).  The interactions
between the elements of the system can only be partly expressed by general models and
have to be tested through simulation, prototype building, and trial-and-error moves where
learning and tacit knowledge play an important part.  Producing an effective solution, such
as a new aircraft, involves a long sequence of moves, each of which is chosen out of an15
enormous set of possibilities.  In turn, the relations among the moves in the sequence can
only be partly known as a full understanding would (impossibly) require the knowledge of
the entire set of possibilities.  The likelihood of combinatorial explosion within the search
space presents a computationally intractable task for boundedly rational agents.
Business firms as well as collaborative ventures among them can be seen as complex, multi-
dimensional bundles of routines, decision rules, procedures and incentive schemes, whose
interplay is often largely unknown both to the managers of the organisation and also to
managers, designers and engineers responsible for single projects.  Of course, over time
many repeated technical and business activities become routinised and codified, allowing
for stable, formal structures and established codified routines as, for example, in the volume
production activities of automobiles or commodity chemicals. In these circumstances, some
sort of "steady state" problem decomposition becomes institutionalised, also allowing the
establishment of neat organisational structures, and, together, the exploitation of economies
of scale and scope. The "Fordist" and "Chandlerian" archetypes of organisation are the
classic example. This is also the organisational arrangement which most forcefully
highlights potential advantages (and also the in-built rigidities) of division of labour and
specialisation.  However, even in this stable case there remain many non–routine, complex
activities within the firm, including new product design, research and development, new
marketing programmes, etc. Even more so, under conditions of rapid market and
technological change all organisations are ultimately forced to shape their structures in order
to respond to new market demands and to exploit new technical opportunities (see, for
example, the related discussions by Coriat and by Fujimoto in Dosi, Nelson and Winter
(2000) on Japanese – “Toyotist” – organisational arrangements and routines).
During the multi-stage product design task, the basic elements to be co-ordinated are
characterised by strong interdependencies which create many local optima within the search
space.  For instance, adding a more powerful engine could lead to a reduction in the
performance of an aircraft or prevent it from flying altogether if the other sub-systems and
components are not simultaneously adapted.  Similarly, at the organisational level, the
introduction of new routines, practices or incentive schemes which have proven superiority16
in another context, could also prove counter-productive if other elements of the organisation
are not appropriately adapted to suit the new inputs (Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000).
A helpful although rough ‘reduced form’ metaphor of the complex task problem is
presented in Kauffman’s (1993) model of selection dynamics in the biological domain with
heterogeneous interdependent traits.  Kauffman considers a model of the selection
mechanisms whereby the units of selection are complex entities made of several non-
linearly interacting components. Units of selection are combinations of N elementary
components which can assume one of a finite number of states and a fitness value is
exogenously assigned to each combination, producing a fitness landscape on the space of
combinations whose characteristics reflect the interdependencies among the constituent
elements.  His model shows that as the number of interdependent elements increases the
fitness landscape presents an exponentially increasing number of local optima.  In the
presence of strong interdependencies (as often the case in many complex products) the
system cannot be optimised by separately optimising each element it is made of.  Indeed, in
the case of strong interdependencies it might well be the case that some, or even all,
solutions obtained by tuning "in the right direction" each component yield a worse
performance than the current one.
In the presence of strong interdependencies the problem cannot therefore be decomposed
into separate sub-problems which could be optimised separately from the others (Marengo,
2000). As argued by Simon (1981), problem-solving by boundedly rational agents must
necessarily proceed by decomposing a large, complex and intractable problem into smaller
sub-problems which can be solved independently.  Within the firm this is equivalent to a
division of problem-solving activities.  Clearly, the extent and efficacy of the division of
such problem-solving efforts is limited by the existence of interdependencies.  If, in the
process of sub-problem decomposition, interdependent elements are separated then solving
each sub-problem interdependently does not allow overall optimisation.  As Simon (1981)
pointed out, a perfect de-composition, which isolates in separate sub-problems all and only
the elements which are interdependent to each other, can only be designed by someone who
has perfect knowledge of the problem: boundedly rational agents will normally try at best to17
design ‘near-decompositions’.  The latter are decompositions which try to isolate the most
relevant interdependencies (in terms of performance) into separate sub-problems.
However, unlike the biological analogy above, the design space of a problem faced by an
engineer or a firm is not given exogenously but, rather, is constructed by the agents as a
subjective representation of the problem itself, in turn shaping a good deal of the search
strategy.  If the division of problem-solving labour is limited by interdependencies, the
perceived structure of the latter, in turn, depends on how the problem is framed by the
problem-solvers.  Sometimes with major innovations, problem solvers are able to make
major leaps forward by re-framing the problem itself in novel ways: for striking illustrations
of the paramount importance of different combinatorics amongst already known system
elements cf. on wireless communications Levinthal (1998) and on the Polaris missile system
Sapolsky (1972).
For the purpose of this work note, first, that specific decomposition schemes do not only
mark the division of labour within individual firms but also the proximate boundaries
between firms themselves. Second, in this framework one may straightforwardly represent
the distinction between competencies on “how to do given things” vs. integrating and search
capabilities. The former clearly include abilities in handling sub-problems, holding
decompositions constant. Conversely, the latter refer to both the ways solutions to sub-
problems are put together and to search patterns for new decompositions/recombinations of
knowledge bases and physical components. Third, as conjectured in Simon (1981), near
decomposable systems have an evolutionary advantage over systems which do not have this
feature, because near decomposability increases the speed of adaptation, confines the
consequences of errors and damaging events to sub-component of the system and guarantee
the “evolvability” of the system, i.e. its capability to produce innovation without
jeopardizing its overall viability and coherence. In particular there are two types of near
decomposable architectures which are particularly relevant for our discussion, namely: a) an
architecture of partially overlapping modules and b) an architecture of nested modules. In
the former modules are separated but for some components they share. A system of nested
modules is instead similar to Russian dollies in which there exists a small set of core18
components which belong to all modules then another larger set which includes the former
and is contained in all the others and so on. Figure 1 depicts the architecture of both
systems.
A system made of partially overlapping modules is in fact very close to Simon’s idea of
near decomposability and enjoys its properties of high adaptability and evolvability. With
respect to search processes, in systems having this feature, components where modules
overlap have obviously a special role since they are also the components for which search
cannot be effectively decentralised. It is also easy to verify that those components which
two subsystems have in common must be kept relatively stable because changes imposed by
one subsystem will jeopardize the search process in the other subsystem. Some form of
control over these interfaces among subsystems is therefore fundamental in order to keep
the system coherent.
A system of nested modules has also specific characteristics investigated at greater length in
Marengo et al. (2002): they are characterized by very strong interdependencies but
nevertheless the search space remains highly decomposable provided that search proceeds
sequentially from the “core” components, which have to be set first, to the more and more
peripheral ones which can be adjusted sequentially.
Both partially overlapping and nested architectures have properties which are very similar to
some of stylised facts about  system integration presented in the previous session. Both
architectures are based on the presence of some key components (and key agents) which are
crucial for adaptation and evolvability and have to be kept relatively stable. At risk of
overtheorizing, think of system integrators as those agents holding knowledge about such
major overlappings and interfaces.
Figure 1: Systems with partially overlapping and nested components19
5. Conclusions: some conjectures on the co-evolution of knowledge accumulation and
organizational boundaries.
The long term history of many contemporary industries in general, and, closer to the
concerns of this work, the dynamics of industries producing CoPS reveal puzzling
divergences between what “firms do” and what “firms know”, or, putting it another way,
systematic divergences between firms’ boundaries as revealed by the scope of production
activities, compared to the scope of knowledge bases which some firms master.
The explanation of these patterns builds on evolutionary interpretations of the role of
knowledge specificities in both production and innovation in different industries (cf.
Freeman (1982), Pavitt (1984), Nelson et al (1999), Teece et al. (1994b), Piscitello(2000)).
Ultimately, the punch line is that in many activities, firms need to “know more” than what is
seemingly required by current production tasks. But such width of knowledge is often a
necessary requirement for firms that perform as crucial knots in putting together complex
outputs, and, even more so, whenever they want to continue to do that in the future. So, for20
example, General Motors reveals significant technological competencies in e.g. plastics,
glass, etc., even if it does not produce them.
Indeed, robust evidence corroborates some long term tendency toward an increasing
division of labour across firms, associated with an ever-lasting emergence of novel
specialized industries (just think of the emergence of a distinct machine tool industry
(Rosenberg (1963)), a pharmaceutical industry (Freeman (1982)), amongst many other
examples). However, complementary to such long term trends, one has observed also, over
at least a century, the  emergence of large multi-technology multi-product corporations,
characterized by varying degree of vertical integration, but always embodying rich
integrative capabilities amongst multiple components and multiple technological bases.
Is something radically new happening today ?
A few analysts have emphasized a growing pattern of division of labour across firms
corresponding to a spreading modularity between components which ultimately make up
complex products (cfr. for example Langlois (2001), Pavitt (2002) and Sturgeon (2002)).
Certainly, such process is at work in many industries. However, it is hardly a new
phenomenon. At least since the 19
th century, processes involving (i) “technological
convergence” in operations common to a number of manufacturing processes; (ii) “output
codification”; and (iii) the growth of markets large enough to sustain a number of small
specialized firms (Pavitt (2002), p. 6) has frequently led to the birth of new specialized
industries and to vertical disintegration. The evidence from CoPS is indeed broadly in line
with such a pattern: specialization in production knowledge and task-specific increasing
returns, among other factors, frequently drive also toward the separation of “chunks of
tasks” between distinct firms.
Having acknowledged all that, however, a more controversial issue concerns whether
“modularity” cum (some) codification of production knowledge will be sufficient to make
the Chandlerian Visible Hand of multi-technology, often big, corporations vanish away (see
Langlois (2001) precisely on the idea of a “vanishing hand”). Our conjecture, drawing on
the evidence from CoPS, is somewhat different and suggests that, other things being equal,21
increasing “modularization” across components and specialization across firms goes hand-
in-hand with increasing requirements of integrative knowledge. In turn, system integrators
will  continue to be crucial repositories of such knowledge. Clearly, the balances between
what this type of firms “know” and what they directly “do” will continue to depend upon
product- and technology-specific patterns of knowledge accumulation and their interfaces.
Relatedly, while it is likely that such balances will move away from the profiles of heavy
vertical integration displayed by classic “Chandlerian” firms, it is also equally unlikely that
they will lead toward “hollow corporations” performing just the role of “brokers” or
“middlemen” bringing together demand and supply of different components.
System complexity is there to stay(and possibly to grow) and so is the knowledge required
to master interfaces and compatibilities across different components: this is indeed a first
crucial task of system integrators. A second, equally important, task is often to bridge
learning trajectories at component level. This is particularly important in all circumstances
where system properties are not driven by innovation in any single crucial component (as
indeed is to a good extent the case of microchips for computers, telecommunication, etc.). In
these cases coordinating the diverse learning trajectories followed by independent
component suppliers might indeed require the expansion of the knowledge bases which
system integrators need to embody (although not necessarily the number of intermediate
inputs they directly manufacture).
In the last resort, our conjecture, based primarily on CoPS but with much broader
implications, is that the tendencies toward vertical disintegration and “Smithian”
specialization  (indeed a secular feature of modern economies) do not correspond to any
general trend toward symmetric patterns of  division of knowledge  across firms. On the
contrary, the more dispersed is production knowledge and the more complex products are
the higher are also the requirement of explicit integrative capabilities embodied in what we
have  called system integrators. In many ways they represents the overlasting Visible Hand
of purposeful organizations which painstakingly and imperfectly try to master, at each time,
the exploding combinatorics among product components, and, dynamically, the coevolution
among the diverse learning trajectories of “Smithian” suppliers.2223
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